Consistency Analogy
A type of Argument by Analogy used to argue for normative consistency: if we treat case A in a certain way (good/bad, permitted/forbidden), we should treat the relevantly similar case B the same way.
1. Cases A and B share morally/legally relevant properties P1, ..., Pn.
2. We judge A to be X (wrong, permitted, required, ...).
â´ 3. We should also judge B to be X.
Example
- âIf we ban guns because they kill people, we should ban cars tooâ (critic responds: cars and guns differ in primary purpose, a relevant disanalogy)
- âIf forced organ donation would be wrong, then forcing someone to remain pregnant against their will is also wrongâ (Judith Jarvis Thomsonâs violinist argument has this structure)
- âWe accept that defending oneself with force is justified; analogously, this country was justified in defending itselfâ
What makes it strong:
- Shared properties are the morally relevant ones, not superficial similarities
- Disanalogies donât bear on the moral judgement
- The interlocutor accepts the verdict on case A; otherwise the analogy collapses
How itâs attacked:
- Disanalogy: point to a morally relevant difference
- Reject the verdict on A: âactually I donât think A is wrong eitherâ
- Reductio: accept the analogy and run it to an absurd conclusion to show something has to give